“…for it is a recognized characteristics of money as a store of wealth that it is barren; whereas practically every other form of storing wealth yields some interest or profit. Why should anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use money as a store of wealth.
Because, partly on reasonable and partly on instinctive grounds, our desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own calculation and conventions concerning the future.”
-Keynes
There are some recurring themes this week in our highlighted charts, debt and leverage will overhang any global economic discussion; however, we see some interesting dislocations that can offer global macro opportunities:
I am concerned about tariffs. They are strong effects on importers and exporters in industries affected by tariffs and we don’t really know how tariffs will impact the supply chain and logistics for many companies. Nevertheless, the strong dollar will have a bigger impact on US exporters across the board.
a good mathematical theorem dealing with economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be good economics; and I went more and more on the rules
I have written about Sherman Kent for years as someone who grappled with uncertainty and the language we use to discuss it. There is imprecision in the words we use such a “likely” and “probable”. Sherman Kent was a professor at Yale University who was called in to co-head the CIA’s National Office of Estimates and improve their forecasting skill. Getting the chance of a bad event wrong has real effects. During his tenure, Kent wrote an important piece on the use of ambiguous words to describe our probable estimates. He worked to end squishy vague language that provided political cover for assessment authors.
Correlation is not causality. Blending two variables on the same graph does not make a relationship, but there is a core link with the relationship between real and financial assets. Financial assets are related to the future ability of issuers to generate cash flows for dividends […]
…the public psychology of going into debt for gain passes through several more or less distinct phases:
(a) the lure of big prospective dividends or gains in income in the remote future;
(b) the hope of selling at a profit, and realizing a capital gain in the immediate future;
(c) the vogue of reckless promotions, taking advantage of the habituation of the public to create expectations;
(d) the development of downright fraud, imposing on a public which has grown credulous and gullible.
“The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions” Irving Fisher
I have fewer concerns this week; however, there is significant risk with inflation. Inflation is growing around the world. We are pass 2% in the US by any number of measures. Let the overshoot begin. There is little reason so see the Fed changing their behavior and there is a stronger case for further money reduction around the world. The trade rhetoric is still high and there is general agreement that further trade action will slow growth, yet we continue to move down this path.
Correlation is not causality. Blending two variables on the same graph does not make a relationship, but there is a core link with the relationship between real and financial assets. Financial assets are related to the future ability of issuers to generate cash flows for dividends or for paying down debt. Growth in real assets are linked to the demand for resources to sustain current and future consumption.
Can anyone who has technical knowledge become a good money manager? This is a fundamental question for the quant revolution.
I have just finished reading the insightful biography of Leonard da Vinci by Walter Isaacson. Isaacson makes da Vinci accessible as a person. HIs description really struck me. Da V+inci should not be placed on a pedestal of genius. He had a humble beginning. He did not have the schooling that others received during the period. What he did have was relentless curiosity. If you look at his notebooks or his art you will see his incredible power of observation and a mind that was not limited by conventionality.
How often should you expect equity bear markets? Using the global diversified MSCI EAFA index, we calculated the number of bear markets, moves down greater than 20%, and corrections, move down greater than 10%, since 1970 by decade. (Hat tip to Ben Carlson of “A wealth of Common Sense” for providing the raw data for developing these charts.) The numbers suggest that you will get 2-3 bear markets per decade. The number of corrections or bear markets total 4 to 7. The average decline of the bear markets is variable. The 2000s decade was horrible with two bear markets more than 50%.
The new HFR bank systematic risk premia indices provide a wealth of information on this growing and important investment area. All alternatives risk premia are not created equal. A review of the return performance over the last year shows that there were clear winners and losers.